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  1The movement toward evidence based policymaking in the United States owes much to 
politicians and scholars like Daniel Patrick Moynihan who once said: “In policy debates 
everyone is entitled to his own opinion but not his own facts.” But facts do not droppeth as the 
gentle rain from heaven but rather are the difficult to obtain first step in the empirical process 
that allows policymakers to establish social success indicators for their policies, understand the 
causal relationships between those policies and social outcomes, and thus more effectively carry 
out policies that best achieve future social successes.   
The United States and the European Union share the common goal of the alleviation of 
poverty for all their citizens. The papers presented at the Joint Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD)/University of Maryland International Conference on 
Measuring Poverty, Income Inequality, and Social Exclusion: Lessons from Europe demonstrate 
that European scholars whose business it is to establish the necessary facts to measure poverty, 
how it changes over time, and what policies best reduce it, share a great deal in common with 
their American colleagues. This is most especially the case with respect to the decisions they 
face in their conceptualization of poverty and in how they choose to operationalize these 
concepts in collecting the data necessary to measure it.  
The primary funder and with rare exceptions the primary institution charged with 
collecting data on economic well being for a given country is that country’s central statistical 
agency. Within the European Union (EU), each state’s statistical agency has been increasingly 
asked to coordinate its micro data gatherings along EU guidelines. The first major success of this 
effort is the EU-SILC (European Union—Survey of Income and Living Conditions). It offers the 
only current ex ante equivalent data on economic well being in each of the 27 EU member states.  
In doing so, the EU-SILC provides an alternative to the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) 
which was previously the main source of micro data on EU countries available to the 
international network of scholars doing poverty research. LIS was and will continue to be 
valuable for capturing longer term trends in economic well being both because it provides at 
least limited access to difficult to obtain cross sectional country data for prior years, and because 
ex post, it equivalizes that data for cross country comparative purposes. However, the EU-SILC 
is likely to be increasingly used both by the EU and the OECD as the source for their official 
  2measures of current poverty and by the international research community. (See Burkhauser and 
Lillard, 2005 for a fuller discussion of data developments in Europe.)
1 
Hence, it is useful to understand the concepts of poverty that these European-based data 
sets were intended to capture. Förster and d’Ercole (2009) provide exactly the kind of 
information necessary to do so. They outline the dominant method of conceptualization and 
operationalization of European poverty measures that informed the EU in its development of the 
questionnaire for the EU-SILC. They do so in the context of their explanation of how the OECD 
tracks its individual member country poverty rates and trends, including those in the United 
States, in its latest cross national comparative study of poverty: Growing Unequal? Income 
Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries (OECD, 2008). Maquet and Stanton (2009), in 
their discussion of official EU member state poverty rates using EU-SILC, show that the 
measurement concepts outlined by Förster and d’Ercole (2009) are, with minor differences, the 
same as the ones used by the EU in their official poverty statistics. 
What is surprising is that for the most part, the United States (U.S.) Census Bureau uses 
similar data and methods to measure U.S. poverty rates; but with a fundamental difference which 
has important implications for those interested in cross-national comparisons of poverty and the 
methods used to alleviate it in the U.S. and the EU. That difference is not the one most 
commonly associated with European and U.S. poverty line measurement issues— that one is an 
absolute measure and the other relative. It is more fundamental. The U.S. is 200 years ahead of 
the EU in recognizing that member states that agree to share a common economic market in 
which capital and labor are free to move from one state to another will inevitably share a 
common set of values and social policies. 
                                                 
1 In addition to the problems discussed in Burkhauser and Lillard (2005), cross national comparisons of national data 
are also affected by changes in the underlying country data used for such comparisons. Burkhauser and Larrimore 
(2009) summarize a set of recent papers demonstrating the problem of using uncorrected data from the United States 
Current Population Survey (CPS), the data set used for the U.S. by LIS and the OECD, in their cross national 
comparisons of income distribution and poverty. For instance, because LIS does not correct for topcoding in the 
public use CPS, their official Gini income inequality values have a significant jump in the years after 1994 that is in 
large part due to an increase in topcoding limits and the introduction of cell means in 1995 rather than any real 
change in the underlying data. Official OECD measures of income inequality are based on the internal CPS data, so 
there is less of a problem of topcoding.   Nonetheless, because they do not correct for this smaller problem in the 
internal CPS data, part of the rise in inequality they report in the years after 1992 is caused by changes in top coding 
and other changes in data collection methods in 1993.     
  3Chief among them is that solidarity does not end at a state’s border. It is telling that 
neither Förster and d’Ercole (2009) nor Maquet and Stanton (2009) provide any poverty measure 
in which relative poverty is based on the economic well-being of the average EU citizen. Instead 
all official EU poverty statistics, as well as OECD official measures of poverty within the EU, 
including those provided in Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD 
Countries (OECD, 2008), are provided as if each state was a completely separate social entity. 
Hence, the economic well being of an EU citizen in a given state depends on his or her income 
relative to only those EU citizens who happen to live in that member state.  
While such a relative concept makes sense for government entities based on blood or 
tribal relationships, it is far less appropriate when these government entities have embraced the 
free movement of capital and labor across their borders and the free market mechanisms that will 
make such archaic relationships increasingly less important in the day to day market activities of 
their citizens. In contrast, in the United States of America, while we certainly provide official 
(U.S. Census Bureau) information on poverty rates at the state level, it is always in the context of 
a single poverty concept directly linking the well being of a given citizen with all other U.S. 
citizens rather than only to members of their same blood, tribe, or state of residence.   
Below I use the expositional model of Förster and d’Ercole (2009) to more systematically 
compare and contrast EU and U.S. poverty measurement methods and the implications they have 
for understanding the fundamental differences between us. 
 
The nuts and bolts of poverty measurement 
Income rather than consumption. Although economics-based conceptualizations of 
individual economic well-being focus on those things that individuals consume—goods, services, 
and leisure—data collection issues have forced European and American researchers to focus 
instead on income. Income consists of both private and government transfer cash income; that is, 
on the ability of individuals to purchase goods and services. Income includes wages and salaries, 
self-employment income, property income (such as interest, dividends, and net rental income) 
and government in-cash transfers. It excludes capital gains, imputed rent, or in-kind government 
  4(Foods Stamps, Medicare, Medicaid, etc.) or private benefits (employer health insurance, etc.) 
And it takes no account of the time and energy—work or reduction in leisure—required to earn it. 
The limits of such measures are well understood in the literature. While alternative 
overall consumption measures have been proposed as well as measures of material deprivation or 
social exclusion, all official OECD, EU, and U.S. poverty measures now are cash income-based. 
The major difference between European and U.S. income measures is that the Europeans 
explicitly remove income tax and social security contributions from gross cash income and make 
all comparisons within and across states using the resultant disposable cash income measure. 
Disposable income is clearly a more accurate measure of one’s ability to purchase goods and 
services in the market and is superior to the gross cash income measure currently used in official 
U.S. poverty measures. 
Counting people rather than households. The EU-SILC, like other European and 
American data sets, collects information on the income of all household members. Households 
can contain families (those related by blood or marriage) and those families contain individuals. 
European poverty measures assume all household income is shared equally among its members 
and that there are some economics of scale in its use, so that they can focus on poverty at the 
individual level. Official United States poverty statistics make the same assumptions but at the 
family level, and their economics of scale assumptions are somewhat different.  
While the choices of sharing unit and scale economies can have substantial impacts on 
the characteristics of those who are found to be in poverty—e.g. the greater the economies of 
scale, the more likely that those in smaller households (widows, older persons) will be counted 
as poor)—these choices do not appear to seriously impact trends in poverty within or across 
countries. (See Burkhauser, Smeeding, and Merz, 1996, for a discussion of the sensitivity of 
cross national poverty comparisons to choice of equivalence scale.) 
Static vs. dynamic. The EU-SILC, like the United States Survey of Income and Program 
Participation, is a short panel design that allows for some more dynamic analysis of poverty 
movements. And, for some OECD countries much longer panels are available. These panels are 
vital for understanding persistent poverty and its causes. But until recently only a few OECD 
countries (e.g. U.S., Canada, Germany, and Great Britain) had either a short or a long term panel. 
  5Hence official poverty statistics in both Europe and the U.S. are based on cross sectional data. So 
there is not much difference here. (See Burkhauser, 2001, for a discussion of the value added of 
panel data for policymakers.) 
Relative vs. absolute. The single most discussed difference between European and 
American poverty measures is that Europeans use a relative poverty scale and the U.S. uses an 
absolute scale. What becomes clearer once these two scales are more carefully considered is that 
they both address two fundamental issues with respect to poverty measurement: 1) what is the 
initial level of poverty that best represents the social minimum level of access to resources for a 
given society?; 2) how should this social minimum level change over time? It is in how our two 
poverty scales relate to these two fundamental issues that our differences are best seen. 
Europeans have historically shown a great deal more interest in the reduction of overall 
income inequality as one of their major social success goals. . Hence, it is not surprising that the 
intellectual underpinnings of their concept of poverty rests entirely on income distribution 
grounds—poverty is defined as having income below some percentage of median income. (The 
OECD uses a 50 percent cutoff point, while the EU uses a 60 percent cutoff point.) Furthermore, 
this is made explicit in some European-style models of economic well-being, in which a person’s 
individual well-being is considered not only a positive function of his or her own consumption 
but is also positively associated with his or her place in the distribution—see Ravallion and Chen 
(2009) in this volume for an example of such modeling.   
Such a concept of poverty not only resolves the first fundamental issue but also the 
second, since as median income rises over time (both because of increases in inflation and 
because of real productivity gains) so will the poverty line. Doing so in principle commits 
governments that use this type of relative poverty line as their poverty goal to guarantee 
sufficient additional revenue to lower income groups each year to not only keep them above a 
constant real social minimum level of economic well being over time but to increase that 
minimum level with economic growth so that they do not fall behind the rest of the population in 
their purchasing power. Under such scoring rules, all persons in the population could improve 
their economic well being but poverty rates could still rise—income distribution goals could 
trump improvement in personal consumption goals. Such social success scales do not recognize 
  6success in reducing poverty unless economic growth increases poor peoples’ income faster than 
that of the median person’s income. 
The United States has historically not focused as much official attention on overall 
income inequality issues, but rather has concentrated on providing some minimum level of 
income for the lower end of the income distribution. Hence, it is no accident that the intellectual 
underpinning of our concept of poverty does not rest explicitly on income distribution grounds 
but rather on the amount of income necessary to purchase some social minimum basket of goods 
and services. Unlike some percent of the median, it is much more difficult to determine what 
should be included in that basket of goods and its cost. Originally the U.S. social minimum was 
based solely on the cost of a healthy diet for a family of three. Later, economies of scale values 
were introduced again based on food consumption.  
That takes care of the first fundamental question; but not the second. In fact, our poverty 
line is increased each year by the inflation rate alone. Governments, like the U.S., that use the 
guarantee of income necessary to purchase a fixed basket of goods and services as their poverty 
alleviation goal will only have to transfer sufficient revenues to lower income groups each year 
to maintain their original level of consumption. Under such scoring rules, poverty rates could fall 
to zero with no change or possibly even an increase in income inequality. That is, economic 
growth would reduce poverty as long as poor people received at least some share of that growth.   
  In reality, the initial official poverty line set by European or American policy makers was 
more a political than a scientific one, as is the degree that the poverty thresholds should be 
sensitive to average real growth. It would have been possible, for instance, for Europeans to have 
chosen a social minimum based on a basket of goods that ended up equaling 50 or 60 percent of 
the income of the median person and then have argued that this basket should grow with real 
median income, and the result would have been the same.  
And, it is likely that when President Lyndon Johnson accepted our initial social minimum 
based on food consumption, he was more interested in the percentage of poor Americans such an 
initial standard captured—not too few as to suggest that poverty was not a serious problem in the 
U.S., but not too many to make doing anything about it too daunting—than in the scientific 
justification for such a standard.   
  7  The limitations of using data on a healthy diet as a measure of the social minimum basket 
of goods and services and of holding that level constant in real terms for very long time periods 
have been discussed in detail in Citro and Michael, 1995, as have many other problems with the 
current U.S. poverty scale—e.g. using disposable income, using a household rather than a family 
as the sharing unit, and more consistent scale economies—that would make it closer in design to 
European-style measures. But as Lerman (2009) points out, the unwillingness of U.S. 
government officials to make any of these changes in the official poverty scales over the last 
decade and a half since the Citro and Michael (1995) report may have more to do with the fact 
that many federal programs use the official state poverty rate to allocate funds to that state rather 
than because of their ignorance of the scientific arguments for doing so. Hence, any reforms in 
our flawed poverty measure will have immediate implications for the size and distribution of 
those federal funds to the states.  
Furthermore, the initial unwillingness of President Johnson to commit the U.S. to a 
poverty scale that automatically increases with economic growth may also have been based on 
the pragmatic argument that future federal government officials might not want to automatically 
ensure that such funds be committed to low income transfers but rather that it be left to future 
generations of citizens to explicitly decide how to distribute the fruit of additional growth and 
hence to explicitly decide when the real social minimum level should be raised.  
In contrast with the very close relationship between changes in our official poverty rate 
and in the level and distribution of federal expenditures to the states, there appears to be no direct 
relationship between the relative poverty line detailed by Förster and d’Ercole (2009) and 
Maquet and Stanton (2009) and actual EU social policies or the policies of its state members. So, 
while the European measure of the social minimum rises with real growth in each state, there is 
no requirement that funds from those states or the EU be allocated based on this increase. Hence, 
the real stakes of such a poverty scale are somewhat lower in terms of its social commitment 
than would be the case in the U.S. 
Förster and d’Ercole (2009) mention current issues in poverty measurement that are also 
of interest in the United States. Most especially is the importance of taking into consideration 
non-cash transfers from government and non-cash benefits from employers as additional sources 
  8of income. (See Sutherland, 2009, and Frick and Grabka, 2009, for examples of the value of 
including non-cash government transfers and Gilbert, 2009, for an example of the value of 
including private non-wage compensation, in measures of income.) In the United States, the 
failure to take into account the value of in-kind government transfers that are primarily targeted 
to low income people in our official poverty calculations understates the resources available to 
them. But it also understates the degree that, for instance, the $35 billion in government 
expenditures spent on an in-kind transfer program like Food Stamps or the $116 billion spent on 
Medicaid improved the economic well being of low income people. (Figures are for 2008 for 
Food Stamps and 2006 for Medicaid. See Burkhauser and Daly, 2009.) 
 
What can we learn from the European approach to poverty measurement?  
  Certain aspects of the European style of poverty measurement should be seriously 
considered as we think about reforms in our official poverty measures. Several are non-
controversial. Disposable income is a better measure of purchasing power and is more consistent 
with the income based measure of poverty we both use. Including the effect of government tax 
policies will account for the degree that taxes reduce personal consumption and in the United 
States would also take account of the degree that tax credits like the Federal Earned Income Tax 
Credit and the state tax credit programs that supplement it, increase the effective wages and 
disposable income of workers in low income households.
2 Counting families without 
considering the number of people within them, which is still done in some Census Bureau 
official statistics, fails to take into account the number of mouths that a given family’s income 
must support and should also be more uniformly done here. And, we should look to Europe for
more sensible way of controlling for econom
 a 
ics of scale.  
                                                
More controversially, using a household rather than a family sharing unit may make 
sense given the number of non-married, non-blood relatives that are now sharing resources but 
who under current rules are counted as not doing so. Even more controversially, it may be time 
to reevaluate the appropriateness of the current implicit goal embedded in our poverty line 
 
2 More controversial but of value in capturing the resources available to households would be including in-kind 
government transfers and the non-wage compensation paid to workers by firms. 
  9measures. Because we have only adjusted our poverty line for inflation over the nearly half a 
century since President Johnson first established our social minimum level, it is still set at the 
same real 1960s War on Poverty income level. Given the considerable economic growth we have 
experience as a country since then; it now may be time to explicitly raise our social minimum. 
But in doing so, it is far less clear that we should use a European-style approach.  
  There are some aspects of current European-style poverty lines that make much less 
sense for the United States and, I would argue, even for the European Union itself. Chief among 
them is the official OECD and EU choice of solidarity reference group in measuring member 
state poverty. Table 1 is cobbled together by me based on Figures 3 and 8 from Tóth and 
Medgyesi (2009). Apparently this European team of researchers did not get the memo that one 
should never provide alternative measures of relative poverty for EU countries in the same paper, 
even if you never connect the dots. By doing so, these figures provide a nice example of the 
dramatic difference in member state measured poverty rates made by one’s choice of solidarity 
reference group, and more broadly, why it is important to make explicit the social goal toward 
which the success indicator is being used to measure progress.  
In their figures, Tóth and Medgyesi (2009) first use the EU 60 percent of that state’s 
household size-adjusted median income as their poverty line to calculate the percentage of 
persons in that state who are poor. They do so based on data from the first (income year 2005) 
wave of EU-SILC data. Column 1 reports the poverty rates of each EU member state using the 
OECD2 equivalent income scale to account for differences in household size. These resulting 
state poverty rates are very close to those reported by Maquet and Stanton (2009) based on 
official EU measures for income year 2006 in their Table 2 (not shown here).  
What is the message from using this social success indicator for EU member states? 
Poverty remains a significant problem in all EU member states with a group bunched at the 
extreme low end (around 10 to 13 percent)—the Netherlands, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Germany, Slovenia, Spain, Finland, Luxembourg, and Austria, several more in the middle and 
another set of member states bunched around the extreme high of around 20 percent—United 
Kingdom, Italy, Greece, Spain, Lithuania, and Latvia. But somewhat surprisingly, column 1 
  10suggests that there is not all that much difference in the risk of poverty across EU member states 
including comparisons of old and new member states.   
But the numbers are quite different when we change the social success indicator by 
extending the solidarity reference group from the median person in the state to the median person 
in the EU. In Table 1, EU member states are arrayed in descending order of their poverty rates 
using an EU wide solidarity group measure.   
As discussed above, in column 1 the cluster of states with the highest poverty rates had 
about twice the poverty rates of the states with the lowest poverty rates. As can be seen in 
column 2 when we now use the whole of the EU as our solidarity group reference and hence 
use .5 of the median income EU person to set an EU wide social minimum, in six member 
states—Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Estonia, Slovakia, and Hungary—the majority of their 
populations are found to be below the poverty line, while twelve member states have poverty 
rates below 5 percent. That is, poverty rates in the high poverty states are now shown to be ten 
times those in the low poverty states.  Hence, the take away message of column 2 is quite 
different from that of column 1. That message is: there is an enormous difference between the 
extremely high poverty rates in the mostly new states of the EU and the extremely low poverty 
rates in most of the original EU member states.
3 
What is driving this dramatic difference in messages? Fundamentally, by focusing solely 
on a state median, the first measure completely ignores cross state differences in income levels. 
Hence, approximately 20 percent of the citizens of Lithuania, Greece, and the United Kingdom 
are considered to live in poverty even though there are substantial differences in average income 
in these states and hence in access to the goods and services available to those with only .6 of 
that income across those states. When solidarity is extended across state borders by using a 
single EU wide social minimum, this disparity becomes much clearer as these states’ poverty 
rates change to 68, 25, and 4 percent respectively.  
Following on our Table 1 comparisons, Table 2 shows the differences in state poverty 
rates in the United States as normally estimated and those same states if we adopted the EU’s 
                                                 
3 Beblo and Knaus (2001) were the first to conceptualize the EU as a single entity and empirically show when doing 
so that residents of Italy, Spain, and Portugal made up a disproportion share of the bottom decile of the overall EU 
population in 1995. 
  11solidarity reference group approach. States are arrayed from highest to lowest based on their 
child poverty rate using Current Population Survey data from 2006 to 2008 as reported on the 
National Center for Children in Poverty website using the standard American social minimum 
approach. The results in column 1 are unsurprising. Official child poverty is most severe in less 
wealthy states—the top ten poverty states include eight from the south as well as the District of 
Columbia and New Mexico.  
While studies using the European approach to estimate poverty on a state basis are rare in 
the United States, column 2 of Table 2 provides one such estimate (Rainwater, Smeeding, and 
Coder, 2001) using the OECD/EU approach—.5 of the household size-adjusted income of the 
median income person in the state. The results substantially change the states with the greatest 
poverty problem. Of the top ten poverty states under our official measure of poverty only New 
Mexico and Louisiana remain. The three states whose children are most likely to be in poverty 
live in New York, California, and Massachusetts.   
Because federal dollar allocations to the states are directly tied to our official state 
poverty rates, such a change would have profound effects on this allocation. It is hard to imagine 
the coalition of American child welfare experts who would argue for a change that would shift 
federal dollars from the poor children of Alabama, Mississippi, and Kentucky to their higher 
income counterparts in New York, California, and Massachusetts because they were more 
relatively deprived.   
But why is this so in America and not in the EU? In my view, in 1789 when our thirteen 
states formally agreed on the rules under which they would become the United States of America, 
there were profound differences among those states, including laws governing slavery that took a 
civil war to resolve. But over time, an increasing share of Americans began to think of 
themselves as Americans first and citizens of a state second. Nonetheless, even two hundred 
years later there are significant state and regional as well as racial and ethnic differences that 
come into play in the allocation of federal and state resources, and it is still difficult to convince 
citizens of wealthier states to subsidize their poorer state cousins. Hence, we still tolerate some 
degree of difference in poverty rates across states as column 1 of Table 2 demonstrates using our 
standard poverty measures.  
  12Because of our heterogeneity of interests, Americans may be less willing to share 
individual resources and to provide a higher social minimum for all Americans than is the case 
for some of the individual states of the EU that are more homogeneous by blood or tribal bonds. 
Nonetheless, it would be laughable to propose that federal government poverty reduction policy 
in the United States be based on a state solidarity group measure like that currently used in the 
OECD or EU to capture poverty across its EU member states. And as a comparison of column 2 
of Table 1 and column 1 of Table 2 shows, our cross state differences in poverty using an 
American wide solidarity group poverty measure are much smaller than those in the EU using an 
EU wide solidarity group measure.
4 
My guess is that it will become increasingly difficult for the EU to maintain its goal of a fully 
integrated EU market economy of the type that we have enjoyed in the United States since our 
inception, while continuing to measure the risk of poverty of fellow EU citizens based solely on 
poverty scales that implicitly argue that solidarity stops at state borders. That is, how much 
longer will the dramatic difference in state poverty rates found in column 2 of Table 1 be 
tolerated before reducing these differences becomes a social goal toward which this type of 
success indicator  measures progress?
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 In a similar vein, Burkhauser and Couch (forthcoming) review the income distribution literature comparing the 
United States and EU countries and make the point that while income inequality in the United States is greater than 
income inequality for most of the EU countries individually, when income inequality is measured across all EU 
citizens, overall income inequality in the EU is much closer to that found in the US as first shown by Brandolini 
(2007).   
5 A careful reading of Nolan (2009) offers a hint that the problems associated with using a single relative poverty 
scale, set at state borders, to capture both within state income inequality and the enormous differences in access to 
consumption across EU state borders, are becoming clearer to European style poverty experts. Nolan (2009) 
provides the intellectual justification for a “material deprivation” measure of poverty which is entirely separate from 
standard income distribution based European poverty scales. Instead, the intellectual origin of material deprivation 
poverty scales, at least as formulated from the 17 items taken from questions on the EU-SILC, appear to be coming 
from the American minimum basket of goods and services tradition of poverty measurement. A tradition in which 
the items in the basket do not vary relative to the average income of the state in which the questions are asked. More 
generally, this suggests that when a society has more than one social success goal with respect to its lower income 
populations, it may be necessary to have more than one measure of social program success.   
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Table 1.  European Poverty Rates by Member State Using Alternative Solidarity Group 
Medians 
  Alternative Solidarity Group Poverty Rates 
Member State  .6 of Median Income of 
Member State 
a 
.5 of Median Income of EU 
population
 b 
Lithuania 20  68 
Latvia 23  63 
Poland 18  58 
Estonia 18  52 
Slovakia 12  50 
Hungary 16  50 
Portugal 18  28 
Czech Republic  10  22 
Greece 20  25 
Spain 20  12 
Italy 19  7 
Slovenia 12  5 
United Kingdom  19  4 
Germany 12  3 
Sweden 12  3 
France 13  3 
Ireland 18  3 
Cypress 16  3 
Belgium 15  2 
Denmark 11  2 
Austria 13  2 
Netherlands 9  2 
Finland 12  2 
Luxembourg 13  1 
EU Average  16  20 
Notes:   
a)  . 6 of the household size adjusted income of the median person in that state using the 
OECD2 equivalence scale.   
b)   .5 of the household size-adjusted income of the median person in the EU using a per 
capita equivalence scale.  
Sources: Adapted from Tóth and Medgyesi (forthcoming) Figures 3 and 8.  
Table 2.  State Child Poverty Rates in the United States Using Alternative Solidarity 
Group Medians  
State  Standard U.S. Method
a  .5 Median Income of State
b 
District of Columbia  33  18.8 
Mississippi 31  18.9 
Louisiana 24  22.8 
Texas 23  20.7 
Alabama 22  20.3 
Kentucky 22  20.5 
New Mexico  22  21.6 
West Virginia  22  18.5 
Arkansas 21  14.1 
Georgia 21  18.8 
Arizona 20  23.6 
New York  20  26.3 
North Carolina  20  17.2 
Oklahoma 20  17.6 
Tennessee 20  18.2 
Missouri 19  13.8 
South Carolina  19  18.0 
California 18  25.7 
Kansas 18  13.0 
Ohio 18  18.6 
Indiana 17  13.8 
Michigan 17  19.5 
Montana 17  13.9 
Florida 16  21.2 
Oregon 16  16.2 
Pennsylvania 16  18.4 
Rhode Island  16  22.7 
Illinois 15  21.7 
South Dakota  15  12.3 
Wisconsin 15  15.1 
Colorado 14  13.1 
Iowa 14  13.0 
Maine 14  13.7 
Massachusetts 14  24.2 
North Dakota  14  12.3 
Delaware 13  18.8 
Idaho 13  13.9 
Nebraska 13  13.0 
Nevada 13  13.1 
Virginia 13  18.8 
Wyoming 13  13.9 
Connecticut 12 22.7 
  17  18
Maryland 12  18.8 
Minnesota 12  15.8 
Utah 12  13.1 
Washington 12 19.0 
Alaska 11  16.1 
Hawaii 11  16.1 
New Jersey  11  21.8 
Vermont 9  13.7 
New Hampshire  6  13.7 
 
Notes:  a) Official U.S poverty measure. 
b) Poverty measure based on OECD guidelines with state as solidarity 
reference group. 
Sources: Column 1 based on National Center for Children in Poverty (2009), 
using CPS survey years 2006-2008. Column 2 based on Rainwater, Smeeding and 
Coder (2001, Table 2.4, p. 61), using CPS survey years 1995-1997. 